הסברתי את עצמי היטב.בשלב שאחרי נפילת הטליבן, אני זוכר שבתכניות שהיו ברדיו בשעה 15:00 -השעה הבין לאומית, דיברו על כך שהאמריקאים תמכו בחמר רוז' ואפילו מגיש התכנית הביע פליאה על כך- אותה פליאה שעולה כאן. איזה מומחה הסביר בדרך די פשוטה את הראציונל. הראציונל שהצגתי אותו- אינה עמדה מקורית שלי. לא טענתי שהאמריקאים תמכו בחמר רוז' ובפול פוט כששלטו בקמבודיה, למרות שאם יסתבר שהם תמכו בעקיפין על ידי פגיעה במתנגדיהם- לא מאד אופתע. למשל המיסמך הבא:
Document 17: Memorandum of Conversation, "Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Chatchai of Thailand," 26 November 1975, 1:00 p.m., State Department, Secret/Nodis
Months after the Indochina debacle, Kissinger had an "informal lunch" with Chatchai Chunhawan, Foreign Minister in the civilian government that came to power after the October 1973 student revolution against the military regime. Part of the new regime's agenda included normalization of relations with Beijing, so China (including Mao's physical condition, prospects for Deng Xiaoping, and the Chinese role in Southeast Asia) came up at several points during the conversation. Another agenda item for the Thai government was the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Thailand; as Kissinger indicated, negotiations had settled most of the issues except for the more sensitive issue of the U-2 deployments in Thailand (they would be redeployed to South Korea in 1976). The conversation, which moved easily from serious issues to banter, touched on the forces withdrawal issue, military aid, and especially regional problems, including the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. Recognizing that Cambodia was controlled by "murderous thugs," Kissinger nevertheless wanted the Thais to tell the Cambodians "that we will be friends with them." That was because he saw Cambodia as a useful "counterweight", especially if aligned with China, to the real adversary, "North Vietnam." Thus, "our strategy is to get the Chinese into Laos and Cambodia as a barrier to the Vietnamese." (Note 15)
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