Wrong.
The failure of the 8th October counter-offensive was not a result of Arik Sharon having "left Bren in the lurch".
Actually, Sharon's 143rd Division, the best and largest reserve formation of Southern Command, was forced by an operationally imbecile offensive plan to rush southwards to a different sector, and it was fully expected that Bren's 162nd Division would carry the offensive on its own sector to a victorious
conclusion.
Sharon's support for Bren was not envisioned in the origianl offensive plan.
Bren failed to exercise proper control over his division and managed only two isolated and badly co-ordinated offensive
in battalion strength.
Only then was Sharon's 143rd Division hurriedly rushed from the southern sector to save the situation, but failed to intervene because of command and control failures of Southern Command. This division spent the entire day of 8 October rushing about from North to South and back and doing nothing except for wasting fuel. It is in this context that nerves became raw and some minor co-ordination problems between 162nd and 143rd divisions on the local level became inflated into major rows between Sharon and Adan, with Gonen (Gorodish) and later Bar-Lev adding fuel to the fire.
But these problems - basically the co-ordination of the deployment of one tank battalion at most - had utterly no bearing on the terrible operational and tactical failure of 162nd Division on the earlier part of the day.
Without endorsing Sharon's command style, much less his political acts and his failures as a strategist: In the Yom Kippur War he was, on balance, more right then wrong, certainly in the sad affair of the 8th October failure.